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Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition
that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as
indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this
intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to
the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many
compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipula-
tion on the agent’s psychological and volitional capacities. Much hangs on this
issue because manipulation-based arguments are among the most important for
defending incompatibilist views of free will. In this paper, I investigate this issue
from a experimental perspective, using a set of statistical methods well suited for
identifying the features of hypothetical cases people’s intuitions are responding to.
Results strongly support the compatibilist view—subjects’ tendency to judge that a
manipulated agent is unfree was found to depend on their judgments that the
agent suffers impairments to certain psychological ⁄ volitional capacities that
compatibilists say are the basis for free will. I discuss the significance of these
results for the use of manipulation cases in the philosophical debate about free
will.
1. Introduction*
The Argument from Manipulation, one of the most powerful in the
incompatibilist’s arsenal, is based on our intuitions about a family of
hypothetical cases called ‘manipulation cases’. In a standard manipula-
tion case, one agent wants to get another agent to perform some
action. But Manipulator does not force Victim to act as she desires, as
would happen in coercion. Rather, Manipulator uses other methods of
influence such as conditioning or social engineering to instill in Victim
a comprehensive suite of desires, values, and other mental states, which
* Earlier versions of parts of this paper were presented at the Moral Psychology
Research Group (Princeton University, March 2010). Special thanks to Eddy
Nahmias for inspiration and very helpful comments.
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thereby lead Victim to choose to perform Manipulator’s preferred
action of Victim’s own volition. (Manipulator’s intervention is typically
supposed to be covert so Victim is unaware of the influence.) Suppose
now that Manipulator is successful and Victim performs the action
Manipulator intended by means of the mental states that Manipulator
covertly shaped. Does Victim act freely?
According to many philosophers (Kane, 1996, Pereboom, 2001),
there is a strong intuition that an agent in a standard manipulation
case is not free, or at the very least that the agent’s freedom is
significantly diminished. Call this the ‘manipulation intuition’. The
question I address in this paper is what feature(s) of cases involving
manipulation is the manipulation intuition sensitive to? Broadly
speaking, two answers have been given. According to incompatibilists,
the manipulation intuition is responsive to the agent’s lack of ultimate
control over her actions. An agent in a manipulation case chooses
actions on the basis of her own desires and values. However, these
desires and values are themselves comprehensively shaped by forces
external to the agent, and in this sense, the agent is not the ultimate
source of her actions. Free will, incompatibilists argue, requires that
an agent exert ultimate control over her actions, and the manipulated
agent’s failure to possess this kind of control is what causes us to
intuitively judge that she is unfree (Kane, 1985, Kane, 1996). Of
course, incompatibilists are quick to add that the failure to be the
ultimate source of one’s actions equally afflicts agents in a determinis-
tic world. This is why intuitions about manipulation cases, coupled
with the appropriate auxiliary premises, have become a mainstay in
contemporary defenses of incompatibilism (and I discuss the details of
how such arguments work below).
According to some compatibilists, however, intuitions about manip-
ulation cases are sensitive to something else altogether. Compatibilists
typically argue that possessing free will amounts to being able to exer-
cise certain key cognitive, evaluational, and volitional capacities. Many
compatibilists have argued that exposure to manipulation damages or
impairs these capacities in some way, thereby rendering the agent
unfree. These compatibilists have proposed a number of different path-
ways by which manipulation can compromise the agent’s psychological
capacities (see Watson, 1987, Kapitan, 2000, Haji, 1998, Mele, 2006,
Wolf, 1990, Dworkin, 1976, Greenspan, 1978, Shoeman, 1978, Scanlon,
1986, Shoemaker, 2003, Faraci and Shoemaker, 2010) and I discuss
two specific pathways a bit later. But setting aside differences about the
pathway(s) by which manipulation exerts these damaging effects, the
key point is that many compatibilists share the view that intuitions in
manipulation cases are not driven by the absence of ultimate control
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(as incompatibilists claim), but rather these intuitions are sensitive to
deficits in the agent’s evaluative and volitional capacities brought about
by manipulation.1
It is worth emphasizing again that the disagreement described above
between incompatibilists and compatibilists over manipulation cases is,
for the most part, not over the following question:
(M1) Intuitively, is a manipulated agent, as described in a
standard manipulation case, unfree?
This is a question about the content of our intuitions, and on this issue
incompatibilists and most compatibilists are in agreement that the
answer is ‘yes’, a victim of manipulation is indeed unfree. Where
incompatibilists and compatibilists diverge is over a quite different
question:
(M2) What features of manipulation cases are our intuitions
sensitive to?
Incompatibilists contend that our intuitions are responsive to the
agent’s failure to be the ultimate source of her actions, while compa-
tibilists argue that our intuitions are responsive to impairments in
certain critical psychological capacities. One might wonder, however,
why (M2) has led to such heated debate and proven so intractable.
After all, (M2) poses a quite specific question, and, thankfully, in con-
trast to many other philosophical questions, there is little disagree-
ment among the disputants about what is the meaning of this
question, or what would count as an appropriate answer. Why then
has the debate about (M2) raged on for decades without any signs of
resolution?
The answer, I believe, is that the task of addressing (M2) is an
instance of a more general problem in philosophical inquiry that I have
previously dubbed the ‘the critical features problem’ (Sripada and
Konrath, 2011). This is the problem of figuring out which among the
many features associated with a hypothetical case are the critical one(s)
our intuitions are responding to. While armchair methods are quite
good at telling us about the content of our intuitions (i.e., they are
quite good at answering questions like (M1)), they are much less
1 In section 1 below, I discuss a key corollary to the compatibilist position: To the
extent that a manipulated agent is not viewed as having suffered damage to key
psychological capacities, the agent is correspondingly not judged to be unfree.
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effective for addressing question like (M2) that concern what features
of hypothetical cases are driving our intuitions.
There are basically two reasons why questions like (M2) are diffi-
cult to answer from the armchair. First, in response to textual
descriptions of hypothetical cases, people may construct very different
mentally represented scenarios. This problem is readily apparent in
the philosophical debate about manipulation cases in which compatib-
ilists seem to be envisioning these cases as involving damage of one
sort or another to the agent’s psychological capacities while incompa-
tibilists seem to be envisioning these cases as lacking these features.
This kind of variability across individuals in how they envision hypo-
thetical cases hampers efforts to get a clear sense of what feature(s)
of these cases our intuitions are sensitive to. Second, even when indi-
viduals all imagine a hypothetical case in the very same way, because
any philosophically interesting case inevitably involves the simulta-
neous presence of a large number of features, there is still the key
question of which among the myriad features present in the case are
the one(s) that are in fact driving our intuitions. This second limita-
tion in the use of armchair methods for addressing the critical fea-
tures problem is indeed very well supported by substantial quantities
of psychological research, which shows that when people are placed
in situations that produce strong intuitive reactions, they are quite
unreliable at identifying which situational feature is the one driving
their intuitive reactions (this extensive body of work is famously
reviewed in Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and its relevance to philosoph-
ical theorizing is clarified and defended in Sripada and Konrath
(2011)). In sum then, it is these two limitations in armchair methods
for solving the critical features problem that, I believe, explain why
questions like (M2) have proven so intractable and have generated so
much heated philosophical debate.
In this paper, I address (M2) from an experimental perspective. In
particular, I report the results of studies of ordinary people’s intuitions
in manipulation cases using certain statistical methods (described in
detail below) that are especially well-suited to helping to uncover what
features of hypothetical cases people’s intuitions are responding to.
This paper is divided into three parts. In part 1, I set up the Argument
from Manipulation in greater detail, and formulate a ‘Compatibilist
Position’ regarding what drives intuitions in manipulation cases. In
part 2, I report the results of two studies of the intuitions of ordinary
people in response to manipulation cases that are designed to test this
Compatibilist Position. In part 3, I discuss the implications of the
findings from these studies for the debate over manipulation between
incompatibilists and compatibilists.
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1. The Argument from Manipulation and
Two Compatibilist Responses
1.1. The Argument from Manipulation
Manipulation arguments are aimed at a family of compatibilist views
that distinguish agents who are free from agents who are not free by
the presence of certain psychological conditions (hereafter called com-
patibilist freedom-conferring psychological (CFP) conditions). Individ-
ual compatibilist accounts differ somewhat on which are the
psychological conditions that matter for an agent to be free. Some
compatibilists emphasize the structure of an agent’s motivations, for
example, whether the agent’s first-order desires conform to her
higher-order volitions (Frankfurt, 1971), or reflect the verdicts of her
valuation system (Watson, 1975). Other compatibilists focus on the
presence of certain psychological abilities, such as the ability to will
(Gert and Duggan, 1979) or the ability to respond to reasons (Fi-
scher and Ravizza, 1998). The crucial insight behind manipulation
arguments is that regardless of which psychological conditions com-
patibilists say are sufficient for an agent to be free, it seems at least
possible that a manipulated agent could fully satisfy these condi-
tions.2 Consider the following case from Derk Pereboom in which
Professor Plum kills Mrs. White due to manipulation by neuroscien-
tists, and notice Pereboom’s description of the manipulated agent’s
psychology:
Plum is not constrained to act in the sense that he does not act
because of an irresistible desire—the neuroscientists do not
provide him with an irresistible desire—and he does not think
and act contrary to character since he is often manipulated to
be rationally egoistic. His effective first-order desire to kill Ms.
White conforms to his second-order desires. Plum’s reasoning
process exemplifies the various components of moderate rea-
sons-responsiveness. He is receptive to the relevant patterns of
reasons, and his reasoning process would have resulted in dif-
ferent choices in some situations in which the egoistic reasons
were otherwise. At the same time, he is not exclusively
2 Some compatibilists seek to build extra historical conditions on top of standard
CFP conditions specifically to block the ability of manipulated agents to count as
being free (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, Mele, 2006). It is unclear whether these
approaches are entirely successful (e.g., see Kapitan, 2000 for a critique). In any
case, as we shall see, the results of the studies reported in this paper suggest that
these extra historical conditions are actually unnecessary. Standard CFP conditions
are in fact sufficient to fully capture intuitions about free will in manipulation
cases.
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rationally egoistic since he will typically regulate his behavior
by moral reasons when the egoistic reasons are relatively
weak—weaker than they are in the current situation. (Pere-
boom, 2001, pg. 112–113).
In this vignette, the manipulated agent exhibits a strikingly compre-
hensive repertoire of psychological attributes and capacities that com-
patibilists say are sufficient for free will. But because the psychological
attributes and capacities by which the agent satisfies CFP conditions
are caused to arise by means of external manipulation, the agent, it
would intuitively seem, is not free. It follows then, according to this
line of reasoning, that fulfilling CFP conditions is not sufficient for
free will.
To sum up, manipulation arguments have the following general
structure:
The Argument from Manipulation
Premise 1: S fulfills all the CFP conditions that compatibilists
say are sufficient for being free.
Premise 2: S’s CFP-relevant psychological states were caused
to arise by manipulation.
Premise 3: S is not free.
Conclusion: Fulfilling CFP conditions is not in fact sufficient for being
free.3
3 This version of the Argument from Manipulation closely resembles the formula-
tions in Kapitan (2000) and McKenna (2008). There is another version of the argu-
ment (see for example Vihvelin, 2007), that goes, very roughly, as follows:
Argument from Manipulation (version 2)
Premise 1: A manipulated agent is not free.
Premise 2: There is no relevant difference between a manipulated agent and
an agent in a deterministic world.
Conclusion: An agent in a deterministic world is not free.
Here, the second premise is contentious. This premise will be true only if a manip-
ulated agent fulfills all CFP conditions. If a manipulated agent fails to fulfill CFP
conditions, as many compatibilists contend, then premise 2 fails. But the question
of whether a manipulated agent fulfills CFP conditions is simply premise 1 of the
first version of the Argument from Manipulation. I conclude version 1 of the
Argument from Manipulation is more fundamental, and version 2 stands or fails
only if version 1 does.
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What do manipulation cases such as ones put forward by Derk
Pereboom, Robert Kane, and Eleonore Stump4 have to do with the
Argument from Manipulation? The most plausible answer is that intu-
itions about manipulation cases are the basis for premise 3. That is,
when presented with a hypothetical case involving a manipulated agent,
the fact that we intuitively judge the agent to be unfree provides good
(albeit defeasible) evidence that the agent is unfree. Now there may be
other strategies by which premise 3 could be defended that do not rely
on intuitions about manipulation cases. However, in what follows, I
assume that intuitions about manipulation cases are critical to support-
ing premise 3 of the Argument from Manipulation, and return to the
question of how else premise 3 might be defended in part 3.
There are two ways for compatibilists to respond to the Argument
from Manipulation. The first compatibilist response, sometimes called
the ‘soft-line’ response—the terminology is due to Kane (1985)—grants
premise 3, but argues the conclusion is false because premise 1 fails.
Rather, it is claimed that victims of manipulation fail to meet key con-
ditions of freedom laid down by compatibilist views. The alternative
‘hard-line’ response grants premises 1 and 2, but denies premise 3.
Instead, it is claimed that a manipulated agent who meets all CFP-con-
ditions is indeed free. I take up each of these compatibilist responses to
the Argument from Manipulation in turn.
1.2. The Compatibilist Soft-line Response
According to the compatibilist soft-line response, manipulation pre-
vents an agent from realizing key CFP conditions. Let us examine two
specific pathways by which manipulation might exert these effects—cor-
rupted information and deep self discordance. Start with corrupted infor-
mation. Consider the question of how a manipulator might achieve her
goal of getting the ‘target’, i.e., the person being manipulated, to per-
form only certain very specific actions at specific times (and not other
actions at other times). The philosophers who have advanced manipu-
lation cases actually provide precious little information to help answer
this question, and instead make only broad references to ‘rigorous
practices of conditioning’ (Pereboom, 2001), vaguely Skinnerian kinds
of behavioral engineering (Kane, 1996), and ‘scripting’ major life events
(Greene and Cohen, 2004). But if we attempt to fill in the details about
how manipulation might succeed, the most plausible scenarios involve
significant corrupting of the information used by the target as a basis to
make decisions. Consider the case of Plum above. How specifically
4 See Pereboom (2001, pg. 112–115), Kane (1985, pg. 40), and Stump (2002, pg. 47–
48).
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might a Manipulator guarantee that young Plum will grow up to be an
adult who will eventually kill Mrs. White? The answer would presum-
ably have to involve some combination of exclusively exposing Plum to
negative information about Mrs. White, suppressing Plum’s hearing of
opinions that dissent from this anti-Mrs. White propaganda, selectively
instilling the idea that murder is the best way of achieving one’s ends,
preventing Plum from experiencing situations in which non-violent
modes of conflict resolution are successful, concealing from Plum the
horrific negative effects of killing, and so on…. But if manipulation
works by corrupting the information available to the target in this way,
then it is plausible that targets of manipulation will in turn be compro-
mised in deploying various freedom-relevant psychological capacities.
For example, in the case of Plum, adult Plum will have sharply limited
and distorted information about the alternative ways of conducting his
life and will be impaired in his ability to assign appropriate evaluative
weights to these alternatives. Thus Plum will be impaired with respect
to basic volitional and evaluative capacities that compatibilists (and in-
compatibilists as well) insist are critical to an agent’s being free.5
A second, related, pathway by which manipulation might prevent an
agent from realizing key CFP conditions is deep self discordance (see
Haji, 1998, Shoeman, 1978 for related discussions). Manipulation cases
operate on the assumption that environmental engineering can instill in
the agent a comprehensive suite of the manipulator’s chosen attitudes.
But this possibility only makes sense if the victim’s mind is something
like a tabula rasa, and does not already have previously entrenched
values, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies. But this tabula rasa
assumption is deeply implausible, even when manipulation begins in the
earliest days of infancy. More importantly for the present purposes, this
tabula rasa assumption is surely unlikely to be thought to be true by
most people.6 It follows then that when presented with a manipulation
case, many people will understand the target’s post-manipulation
5 The notion of corrupted information being developed here is importantly distinct
from the notion of insanity (i.e., compromised normative competence) that figures
heavily in the account of free will developed by Susan Wolf (Wolf, 1990, Wolf,
2003). For a helpful discussion of the differences between the two notions, see
Faraci and Shoemaker (2010).
6 The evidence is now overwhelming (see for example Harris (1998), Plomin et al
(2001), and the section on ‘Nativism’ in Mason et al (2008)) that a sweeping anti-
nativist view of the contents of the minds of human infants is untenable, and most
educated people know this, either through direct contact with the evidence, or
through participation in the cultural milieu in which this evidence is routinely con-
veyed. These individuals are likely to believe (correctly) that manipulation that
begins even at the earliest days of infancy will of necessity overlay (or replace)
significant elements of the agent’s pre-existing evaluative repertoire.
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psychology as involving two layers of attitudes. There is a surface layer
that consists of the superficial values, attitudes, and behavioral tenden-
cies instilled by manipulation. And there is a deeper layer in which the
agent’s antecedently present ‘real’ values, attitude, and core commit-
ments reside. Moreover, the attitudes that reside in the agent’s deep and
surface layers may not be in harmony. For example, in the case of
Plum, people may understand his adult psychology as involving sub-
stantial discordance between surface attitudes instilled by manipulation
that endorse killing Mrs. White, and deep attitudes that lie below that
abhor killing (and which Plum shares with most all normal humans). Of
note, the notion of an agent’s deep self, and the related ideas that an
agent can fail to be identified with, or can be actively alienated from,
her own attitudes has been developed in sophisticated ways in recent
philosophical writings (Watson, 1975, Wolf, 1990, Frankfurt, 1988). My
purpose here has been to sketch only the simplest and least theoretically
committed version of a deep versus surface distinction. Though simple,
this distinction is sufficient to capture in the broadest terms one path-
way by which manipulation might undermine key CFP conditions.7
Notice that people’s tendency to understand a manipulated agent as
being in a state of deep self discordance and their tendency to see the
agent as a victim of corrupted information need not be independent,
and indeed are likely to be intimately connected. Recall that an agent
who suffers from corrupted information will deliberate among a nar-
rowed set of options and assign inappropriate weights to whatever
options she envisions. Hence, she will end up selecting courses of action
that do not reflect, and indeed might even actively discord with, her
underlying values and commitments (i.e., the agent will be in a state of
deep self discordance). Thus these two pathways by which manipula-
tion might prevent an agent from realizing key CFP conditions—cor-
rupted information and deep self discordance—are in fact likely to be
closely connected, with people’s judgments that the agent suffers from
the former supporting judgments that she also suffers from the latter.
1.3. The Compatibilist Hard-line Response
The compatibilist soft-line response says that a manipulated agent does
not in fact fulfill key CFP conditions and therefore is not free. The
compatibilist hard-line response, in contrast, says the manipulated
7 There are close cousins of manipulation arguments, such as Alfred Mele’s intrigu-
ing zygote argument (Mele, 2006, pg. 184–195), in which it is unambiguous that
the manipulator creates all the target’s mental states, without rewriting or overlay-
ing any existing mental states. I believe these ‘creation’ cases, in contrast to manip-
ulation cases, do not generate an intuition that the agent is unfree, and I expand
on this point elsewhere (Sripada, in preparation).
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agent does fulfill all CFP conditions and therefore is free (i.e., this
response grants premises 1 and 2 of the Argument from Manipulation,
but claims that premise 3 is false). Compatibilists diagnose intuitions in
manipulation cases as arising from our tendency to see a manipulated
agent as exhibiting deficits in psychological capacities. But it is a corol-
lary of this compatibilist position that if we do not envision the agent
as suffering from psychological deficits (that is, if we envision the agent
as having been spared any kind of psychological damage), then a hard-
line response is justified—the manipulated agent is in fact free.8 For
example, Harry Frankfurt discusses two ways that manipulation might
operate. One possibility involves ongoing intrusive modifications of the
agent’s psychology, which Frankfurt says clearly renders the agent
unfree. Referring to the Manipulator as the ‘D ⁄n’ for ‘Devil ⁄neurolo-
gist’, Frankfurt then writes,
The other possibility is that the D ⁄n provides his subject with
a stable character or program, which he does not thereafter
alter too frequently or at all, and that the subsequent mental
and physical responses of the subject to his external and inter-
nal environments are determined by this program rather than
by further intervention on the part of the D ⁄n. In that case
there is no reason … against allowing that the subject may act
freely or against regarding him as capable of being morally
responsible for what he does.’ (Locke and Frankfurt (1975),
pg. 27; see also Kapitan (2000), Hajji (1998), Mckenna (2008)
for related arguments along these lines)).
Of course, many compatibilists believe that envisioning the agent in a
manipulation case as not suffering from psychological deficits is difficult
because, as discussed above, the most plausible pathways by which
manipulation might succeed appear to inevitably inflict psychological
damage on the agent. But to the extent that we are able to imagine the
manipulated agent as having been spared psychological damage, com-
patibilists often concede that we would then judge that the agent is
free. Putting together these soft-line and hard-line strands in compatibi-
list thinking yields the following full statement of the compatibilist
position:
8 This hard-line response presupposes that the idea of a manipulated agent who is
psychologically undamaged is in fact coherent, which many compatibilists either
implicitly or explicitly grant. For example, Michael McKenna writes, ‘… I can see
no way to foreclose the metaphysical possibility that the causes figuring in the crea-
tion of a determined morally responsible agent could not be artificially fabricated’
(McKenna, 2008).
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‘Compatibilist Position’ Regarding Intuitions in Manipulation Cases
1. Intuitions in manipulation cases are sensitive to whether or not
there is damage to the manipulated agent’s psychological
capacities (due to factors such as corrupted information and
deep self discordance).
2. (Soft-line) To the extent that the manipulated agent is seen as
exhibiting damaged psychological capacities, the agent is intui-
tively judged to be unfree.
3. (Hard-line) To the extent that the manipulated agent is not
seen as exhibiting damaged psychological capacities, the agent
is intuitively judged to be free.
2. Intuitions about Manipulation: An Experimental Investigation
The Compatibilist Position stated above readily lends itself to empirical
testing. To see this, it is important to recognize that at its heart, the
Compatibilist Position is making a claim about the association between
two judgment variables: 1) judgments that the manipulated agent suf-
fers from psychological impairments; and 2) judgments that the manip-
ulated agent lacks free will. The psychological sciences have developed
a sophisticated toolkit of techniques for assessing the interrelationships
between judgment variables including questionnaire-based methods for
measuring people’s intuitive judgments as well as validated statistical
methods for quantifying the strength of the relationships between these
variables and the confidence that is warranted that hypothesized rela-
tionships between variables really exist.
To test the Compatibilist Position regarding intuitions in manipula-
tion cases, I conducted two studies involving a total of 360 subjects.
Study#1
In Study#1, all subjects (n = 240) read the following base vignette.
Bill and Dr. Z9
One day, Bill sees a woman named Mrs. White as she is jog-
ging in the park. Bill hates this woman, and deliberates about
9 This vignette is loosely based on the Professor Plum vignette (presented earlier) from
Pereboom (2001) and the ‘Mr. Puppet’ vignette from Greene and Cohen (2004).
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what to do. After weighing his options, Bill decides he should
kill her. Bill’s mind is not clouded by rage or other extreme
emotions. Rather, Bill thinks clearly and carefully about his
own desires and values, and only then makes a decision. After
he kills Mrs. White, Bill reflects on his action. He wholeheart-
edly endorses what he has done.
But there is more you need to know about Bill, and how he
came to be the person that he is now:
There is a man named Dr. Z who is a scientific genius and
who is an expert at indoctrination. Dr. Z hates Mrs. White
and formed the following plan. Dr. Z would take an infant
from an orphanage and raise the child himself. He would teach
and reward just the right behaviors in the child so the child
would hate Mrs. White and want her dead. He would script all
the major events in the child’s life to nurture and cultivate in
the child the goal of doing whatever it would take to kill Mrs.
White. Dr. Z tried this plan previously on five other children,
and each time the child grew up to kill Dr. Z’s intended
targets.
Half of the subjects were in the Manipulation condition and read the
following conclusion to the vignette:
Dr. Z implemented his plan for Bill. He took Bill from an
orphanage when Bill was an infant. The plan worked—once
Bill had grown up, Bill had the desire to do whatever it takes
to kill Mrs. White. Dr. Z’s plan was kept completely hidden
from Bill. Bill never knew that Dr. Z implemented the plan.
The other half of the subjects were in the No Manipulation condition
and read the following alternative conclusion to the vignette:
Dr. Z was getting ready to implement his plan for Bill. He
was about to take Bill from an orphanage when Bill was an
infant. But at the last minute Bill was adopted by another
family. But completely by chance, it turned out that Bill came
to hate Mrs. White without any influence from Dr. Z at all.
Once Bill had grown up, Bill had the desire to do whatever it
takes to kill Mrs. White. Thus Bill turned out exactly how
Dr. Z planned all along, but Dr. Z did not actually imple-
ment his plan at all.
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Subjects then answered a number of questions (Table 1) designed to
probe their perceptions of Bill’s level of free will, and the degree to
which he suffers from corrupted information and deep self discordance.
Results showed that the two different versions of the vignette pro-
duced the expected directional effects on people’s intuitive judg-
ments.10 Subjects presented with the Manipulation version of the
vignette were significantly less willing to say that Bill killed Mrs.
White of his own free will (Q1), was in control of whether or not he
Table 1:
Questions Used in this Study.
Question ⁄
Variable # Question Wording
Anchors for
7-point scale Factor Name
1 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill killed Mrs. White




2 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill was in control of
whether or not he killed Mrs. White.
Strongly Agree,
Strongly Disagree
3 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill is morally
responsible for killing Mrs. White.
Strongly Agree,
Strongly Disagree
4 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill killed Mrs. White
based on false information about
her, and he was deprived of any





5 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill was never taught
about why certain actions are
right and wrong, so he does not
truly know that killing
Mrs. White is wrong.
Strongly Agree,
Strongly Disagree
6 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill killed Mrs. White
because his upbringing kept him
ignorant of alternative,
non-violent, ways of acting.
Strongly Agree,
Strongly Disagree
7 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill’s killing of
Mrs. White does not reflect the






8 How much do you agree with the
statement: The real Bill did not truly
want to kill Mrs. White—Bill killed
only because Dr. Z wanted him to.
Strongly Agree,
Strongly Disagree
9 How much do you agree with the
statement: Bill is constrained by
Dr. Z to act in a way that differs




10 See Table A1 in the appendix for complete reporting of results for all questions in
this study.
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killed Mrs. White (Q2), and was responsible for killing Mrs. White
(Q3), compared to subjects presented with the No Manipulation
version of the vignette (all p values < 0.001). For example, 91% of
subjects in the No Manipulation condition expressed agreement11 with
the statement ‘Bill killed Mrs. White of his own free will’ compared
to only 36% of subjects in the Manipulation condition, and similar
differences were observed for the other two free will-related questions
(Q2 and Q3). These results appear to support the position that the
folk as a group share philosophers’ intuitions that manipulation com-
promises free will. But the decisive question (i.e. the question that
divides incompatibilists and compatibilists) remains: What features of
cases involving manipulation are people’s free will intuitions respond-
ing to? To address this question, I conducted a series of further
analyses.
Correlation Analysis
The Compatibilist Position predicts that there will be an inverse rela-
tionship between ratings of whether Bill killed Mrs. White of his own
free will (Q1; ‘free will ratings’) and ratings of whether Bill suffered
from corrupted information (Q 4-6) and deep self discordance (Q 7-9).
Correlation analysis, which measures the association between two vari-
ables, provides a useful means to test this prediction. Results strongly
supported the compatibilist view, with large and highly statistically sig-
nificant negative correlations observed between free will ratings and
ratings for corrupted information (Q 4-6) and deep self discordance (Q
7-9) (correlations ranged from )0.436 to )0.650; all p values < 0.001;
see Table A2). Put another way, there was a very strong (and highly
statistically significant) tendency for subjects who saw Bill as suffering
from corrupted information and deep self discordance to also see Bill
as lacking free will.
Simple Mediation Analysis
The Compatibilist Position makes a still stronger prediction. It pre-
dicts that when subjects are presented with two cases, matched in all
respects but for the fact that one case involves manipulation but the
other does not, then the difference between the two cases in people’s
judgments about free will should be mediated by the difference
between the two cases in people’s judgments about the presence of
corrupted information and deep self discordance. Mediation analysis
11 Agreement was assessed as a score of 1, 2, or 3 on a 7 point scale where
1 = Strongly agree and 7 = Strongly disagree.
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is well suited to test this compatibilist prediction.12 Mediation
analysis assesses the hypothesis that one variable (the predictor)
affects another variable (the outcome) by influencing an intervening
variable (the mediator) (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Figure 1 shows a
mediation model in which the vignette type variable (i.e., presenting
subjects with either the No Manipulation or Manipulation version of
the vignette) potentially influences free will judgments by two path-
ways: 1) An indirect pathway (paths a and b) that involves cor-
rupted information or deep self discordance ratings as mediators; or
2) a direct pathway (path c) that does not involve corrupted infor-
mation or deep self discordance ratings as mediators. Compatibilists
predict the indirect pathway will be statistically significant (since they
claim that free will judgments in manipulation cases are driven by
judgments that the agent suffers from corrupted information and ⁄or
deep self discordance). Six separate mediation models were con-
structed, one for each of the six candidate mediating variables (i.e.,
Q 4-9). In five of the six models (all models except for Q6), the
indirect pathway was found to be highly statistically significant (all p
values < 0.001). Moreover, the mediating variables individually
accounted for a sizable portion (range between 10–45%) of the vari-
ance in free will judgments.13 These results provide strong evidence
that the difference in free will judgments between the two versions
of the vignette was significantly influenced by people’s judgments
Figure 1: Simple Mediation Model. In this model, the type of vign-
ette presented to subjects (No Manipulation versus Manipulation)
affects free will ratings through either a direct path (path c), or an
indirect path (paths a and b) that involves corrupted information or
deep self discordance ratings as mediators.
12 In an insighful study, Nahmias and Murray (2010) used mediation analysis to
probe how the folk understand (or misunderstand) agency in a deterministic world
with resulting implications for free will.
13 See Table A2 for the results of the six mediation models.
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about corrupted information and deep self discordance, and thus
they support the Compatibilist Position.
Structural Equation Modeling
Structural equation modeling (SEM) provides a still more powerful
way to test the Compatibilist Position.14 Figure 2 shows a structural
equation model of the results of this study. The model is the end
product of a sequence of steps in which the assumptions of the
model were tested and the fit of the overall model was evaluated.
These steps are somewhat technical and described in the Appendix.
In short, the model passed the preceding ‘quality checking’ steps.
Here, my aim is to convey an intuitive sense of the findings from
the model. Readers interested in the details are referred to the
Appendix.
Figure 2: Structural Equation Model. In this model, two candidate
mediators (Deep Self Discordance and Corrupted Information) fully
explain the relationship between the type of vignette presented and
Free Will judgments. Statistically significant paths are shown as solid
arrows, while non-significant paths are shown as dashed arrows.
* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
14 SEM is an established statistical approach in the behavioral sciences (PsychInfo
retrieves > 10,000 citations for SEM over the last 3 decades; see Kline, 2005 for
an introduction to SEM). SEM allows several capabilities that go beyond simple
mediation analysis. These include: 1) The ability to model measurement relation-
ships in which a group of observed variables serve to jointly indicate an underlying
unobserved variable; 2) The ability to model complex interrelationships between
variables (rather than just a simple triangular mediation relationship); and 3) the
availability of fit statistics that allow for significance testing of the overall model,
rather than just significance testing of individual paths within a model.
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Let us begin with an orientation to the overall model. On the left
hand side of the model is a rectangle that represents the Vignette
Type variable, i.e., presenting to subjects either the No Manipulation
or Manipulation version of the vignette. This variable potentially
influences two candidate mediators, the Corrupted Information vari-
able and Deep Self Discordance variable (shown in the middle of the
model), which in turn potentially influence the outcome variable, the
Free Will variable (shown on the right hand side of the model).
Notice the candidate mediating variables and the outcome variable are
shown as circles, and are connected by arrows with a number of other
variables shown as unshaded rectangles. The circles are latent variables
(also called ‘factors’) and unshaded rectangles are indicator variables.
The values of the latent variables are not directly observed, but rather
their values are estimated from the indicator variables, which are
directly observed. The values of the indicator variables are the ratings
obtained from the questions presented to subjects (Table 1), and they
are grouped so that closely related questions serve to indicate a com-
mon underlying latent variable. In particular, questions 1–3 indicate
an underlying Free Will factor, questions 4–6 indicate an underlying
Corrupted Information factor, and questions 7–9 indicate an underly-
ing Deep Self Discordance factor. The arrows linking one variable to
another are paths, and the coefficients associated with paths represent
the strength of the relationship between the two variables linked by
the path. Path coefficients range from 0 to 1, with a coefficient of 1
indicating a perfectly predictive relationship between the two variables
linked by the path, while a coefficient of 0 indicates the absence of a
relationship between these two variables (specifically along that partic-
ular path).
In the SEM model shown in Figure 2, there are two critical find-
ings. First, the coefficient of the direct path linking the Vignette Type
variable to the Free Will variable is not statistically significant. The
second important finding concerns the three indirect pathways linking
the Vignette Type variable to the Free Will variable (paths A&E,
paths C&G, and paths C,D&E). Notice the coefficients along these
three indirect paths are all statistically significant. The combination of
these two findings provides very strong evidence for the Compatibilist
Position.
To see why, recall that compatibilists believe that people’s intu-
itions about free will in manipulation cases are driven by judgments
of the presence of deep self discordance and corrupted information.
Thus, compatibilists would predict that the paths along the three
indirect paths that involve Corrupted Information and Deep Self Dis-
cordance as mediators will be large, which is in fact exactly what was
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found. Indeed, formal mediation calculations reveal that 82% of the
effect of the Vignette Type variable on Free Will judgments is
accounted for by these indirect paths. The fact that the direct path is
not statistically significant is also important. This means that the indi-
rect paths involving Corrupted Information and Deep Self Discor-
dance as mediators fully account for the influence of the Vignette
Type variable on Free Will judgments. Put another way, reading the
No Manipulation versus Manipulation version of the vignette had no
significant effect at all on Free Will judgments over and above the
effect it had on producing different interpretations of whether the sce-
nario involved Corrupted Information and Deep Self Discordance.
Thus, once the influence of Corrupted Information and Deep Self
Discordance is accounted for, there is no further difference in Free
Will judgments between the Manipulation and No Manipulation con-
ditions of this study.15
Study#2: The Effect of Providing More Information about Manipulation
A sizable number of subjects in Study#1 saw manipulation as inflicting
psychological damage on the agent.16 One worry about this result is
that perhaps subjects perceived the agent as suffering from psychologi-
cal damage because they misunderstand how manipulation is supposed
to work. Manipulation is supposed to be non-coercive in that it
operates through an agent’s desires and values rather than in opposi-
tion to them. Moreover, the upbringing of a manipulated agent is
supposed to resemble a normal upbringing in most all respects, and is
not supposed to involve complete ignorance of morality or other kinds
of enforced ignorance. Now it may very well be difficult for subjects to
imagine manipulation cases in this way. After all, as noted in Section
1, it is quite difficult to see how manipulation might succeed without
inflicting damage to the agent’s psychology. Nonetheless, to minimize
15 Incompatibilists, on the other hand, would predict that only the direct pathway will
be statistically significant and the indirect pathways will not. This is because they
believe that intuitions about free will are not influenced by deep self discordance
and corrupted information, but rather are influenced by another factor (i.e.,
absence of ultimate control) that is not explicitly measured in the current study.
Any unmeasured mediators of the relationship between the Vignette Type variable
and Free Will judgments would contribute to the overall effect along the direct
path, which is why incompatibilists should predict that the direct path will be large.
However, the coefficient along the direct path is in fact not statistically different
than 0, so this prediction clearly was not supported by the data.
16 Among subjects in the Manipulation condition in Study#1, questions about Deep
Self Discordance yielded an average of 38% agreement and questions about Cor-
rupted Information yielded an average of 63% agreement, with the remainder neu-
tral or disagreeing.
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the possibility that subjects are misunderstanding how manipulation is
supposed to work, it would be helpful to utilize a vignette that pro-
vides even clearer descriptions of the manipulated agent’s upbringing
and how manipulation impacts the agent’s adult psychology. For this
reason, I conducted a second study. Subjects (n = 120) in this study
read the same vignette from the Manipulation condition of Study#1.
At the end of this vignette, they read the following additional
paragraph.
Bill is like anyone else in many respects. As he was growing
up, Bill was educated about morality, the difference between
right and wrong, and various ways he might conduct his life.
Additionally, Bill was not simply fed lies about Mrs.
White—he knows the truth about who she is and he knows
exactly why he dislikes her. Bill is not a robot who simply does
as others instruct. Nor is he under the grip of an irresistible
impulse. Rather, Bill is a person, with desires, values, hopes,
and dreams just like anyone else. But Bill’s desires include kill-
ing Mrs. White. And his core values permit killing Mrs. White.
So that is exactly what he does.
Subjects then answered the same questions as in Study#1. It was
hypothesized that this additional paragraph of information about how
manipulation is supposed to work would lead subjects to be less likely
to judge the agent suffers from corrupted information and deep self
discordance. However, if this is correct, then the Compatibilist
Position implies two further predictions. First, it predicts that to the
extent that Bill is judged not to suffer psychological damage, then Bill
will be more likely to be judged to be free. Second, the Compatibilist
Position makes the same mediation prediction as in Study#1. That is,
it predicts that differences in free will judgments between the ‘High
Information’ Manipulation vignette from Study#2 and the No Manip-
ulation vignette from Study#1 will be fully explained by corrupted
information and deep self discordance judgments as mediating
variables.
Results from Study#2 showed that the addition of the extra para-
graph of information had its intended directional effect. Compared
to subjects in the Manipulation condition from Study#1, subjects in
Study#2 expressed significantly less agreement with statements that
Bill suffered from corrupted information (i.e., Q4, Q5, Q6; all p
values < 0.001). They also expressed less agreement with statements
that Bill suffered from deep self discordance (i.e., Q7, Q8, Q9),
though only for Q8 did the differences reach statistical significance
(p < 0.05).
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Prediction#1 was confirmed in that in response to the Study#2
Manipulation vignette, the majority of subjects (66%) judged that
Bill does have free will in killing Mrs. White. Statistical testing
revealed that this percentage is significantly higher in Study#2
compared to the Manipulation condition from Study#117 (though
significantly lower than the No Manipulation condition from
Study#118).
Simple mediation analysis was used to test Prediction#2. Results
showed that judgments that Bill suffered from corrupted information
(specifically Q4) and deep self discordance (specifically Q7, Q8, and
Q9) played a highly significant role in explaining people’s free will
judgments (p values for the mediation pathways for these variables
were all < 0.001; see Table A4). Moreover, once differences in deep
self discordance judgments were controlled for, there was no longer any
difference in free will judgments between the Manipulation vignette in
Study#2 and the No Manipulation vignette in Study#1 (Table A4).19 In
other words, similar to the results from Study#1, reading the Manipu-
lation vignette from Study#2 had no significant effect at all on free will
ratings over and above the effect it had on producing judgments that
the agent suffered from certain kinds of psychological damage—just as
the Compatibilist Position predicts.
3. Implications for the Philosophical Debate about Manipulation
The preceding studies used correlation analysis, simple mediation
analysis, and structural equation modeling to show that when
presented with manipulation cases, subjects’ judgments that the agent is
unfree were strongly predicted by their judgments that the agent suf-
fered from corrupted information and deep self discordance. Indeed,
these two factors fully explained variation in people’s free will judg-
ments so that once variation in these two factors was accounted for,
there were no remaining differences in free will judgments between
vignettes involving manipulation and a matched vignette in which
manipulation was absent. This finding supports the conclusion that our
17 66% vs. 36%; X2 = 21.61, p < 0.001.
18 66% vs. 91%; X2 = 22.10, p < 0.001.
19 A single mediation model was constructed in which Q7, Q8, and Q9 served as
mediators. This model accounted for 90% of the variation in free will judgments,
and the direct pathway was no longer statistically significant (p = 0.499). A full
structural equation model of differences in responses to the Manipulation vignette
in Study#2 and the No Manipulation vignette in Study#1 was not attempted. This
is because several variables differed between the two vignettes either only minimally
(Q2 and Q3 differed by less than 1 point on a seven point scale), or not at all (Q5).
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intuitions in manipulation cases track the features that compatibilists
say they track (i.e., the agent’s possessing impaired psychological
capacities) and do not track the features that incompatibilists say they
track (i.e., the agent’s lack of ultimate control over his or her actions).
The results of this study have implications for the debate between
incompatibilists and compatibilists over free will. Incompatibilists claim
that compatibilists cannot accommodate our intuitions that a manipu-
lated agent is unfree. The results of this study suggest that this charge
against compatibilism is incorrect. These results instead suggest that the
intuition that a manipulated agent is unfree is driven primarily by judg-
ments that the manipulated agent is compromised with respect to pre-
cisely the kinds of psychological capacities compatibilists regard as the
basis for free will. Indeed, the results of the present study suggest, some-
what ironically, that far from being a problem for compatibilism, manip-
ulation cases might even be seen as a kind of justification for
compatibilist views. Insofar as what drives folk intuitions in manipula-
tion cases is subtle tracking of just the kind of freedom-conferring
conditions that compatibilists have long defended, then it seems that
manipulation cases provide evidence for compatibilist principles by
showing these principles are indeed deeply enshrined in the folk
conception of freedom.
Incompatibilists can respond to some of these claimed implications
of this study in at least two ways. One incompatibilist response chal-
lenges that this study accurately characterizes intuitions in manipula-
tion cases (or more specifically, that this study accurately characterizes
what features of manipulation cases our intuitions are responding
to). The second line of response concedes that this study accurately
characterizes intuitions about manipulation cases (or at least does not
seek to press an objection along these lines), and instead denies that
intuitions about manipulation cases matter to the success of the
Argument from Manipulation. This line of response thus sees the
present study as for the most part irrelevant to the philosophical
debate about manipulation and free will. I take each of these
responses up in turn.
The first incompatibilist response claims that this study fails to accu-
rately characterize what features of manipulation cases our intuitions
are responding to. One approach to pressing this objection focuses on
the fact that the study was conducted with ordinary people who lack
philosophical training or expertise. Manipulation cases typically require
complex and sophisticated imaginings on the part of the subject whose
intuitions about the case are being elicited. In particular, they require
subjects to imagine and appreciate certain highly abstract and nuanced
ideas, such as the idea that manipulation is non-constraining and com-
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prehensive, and is supposed to operate through the agent’s motivation
rather than in opposition to it. If the philosophically naive subjects in
this study thought that a manipulated agent suffers from corrupted
information and deep self discordance, then, so says the objector,
clearly they were not imagining the case correctly. In which case, why
should their intuitions matter much to the philosophical debate?
In answering this ‘the folk are too unsophisticated’ objection, I begin
by noting that the objection is only partially right—many subjects
presented with the Manipulation versions of the vignette did perceive Bill
as suffering from deep self discordance and corrupted information. But it
is also important to realize that there was substantial variability in these
judgments, and a sizable number of subjects did not perceive Bill as suf-
fering from these problems. Indeed in Study#2, which was particularly
explicit and detailed in characterizing Bill’s development and adult psy-
chology, only a minority of subjects regarded Bill as suffering from these
problems.20 Hence, in this respect, most subjects were imagining the case
just as incompatibilists say one must. But what is most striking is not
merely the presence of this variability, but rather how this variability was
related to judgments about whether the agent is free: To the extent that
people thought that Bill suffered from deep self discordance or corrupted
information, or both, they tended to think Bill lacked free will in killing
Mrs. White. While to the extent that people thought Bill did not suffer
these afflictions, they tended to think that Bill possessed free will in killing
Mrs. White. Hence, the objection fails because ordinary people can imag-
ine manipulation cases as not involving impairments in psychological
capacities, just as incompatibilists insist the case must be imagined. But
the problem for incompatibilists is that to the extent that people imag-
ined these manipulation cases as not involving psychological impairments
in just the way that incompatibilists say they should, they commensu-
rately did not see the agent as lacking free will. Rather, they tended to
see the agent as free, which is precisely the pattern predicted by the
Compatibilist Position as outlined in section 1.3.
A still deeper problem with the ‘the folk are too unsophisticated’
objection is that subjects in this study do not display a strange or incom-
prehensible pattern of responses. Rather, subjects evidence precisely the
pattern of intuitive responses predicted by the Compatibilist Position.
That is, subjects seem to respond to precisely those features that
compatibilists have proposed are driving intuitions in manipulation cases
(i.e., the presence of psychological impairments), and they respond in the
20 Among subjects in the Manipulation condition in Study#1, questions about Deep
Self Discordance yielded an average of 38% agreement and questions about Cor-
rupted Information yielded an average of 63% agreement, with the remainder neu-
tral or disagreeing. In Study#2, the respective percentages were 32% and 30%.
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predicted way with judgments of diminished free will when they perceive
such impairments as present. Moreover, the Compatibilist Position itself
summarizes the views of leading compatibilist thinkers (see the Introduc-
tion and section 1). And there is no reason to believe these compatibilist
thinkers are unsophisticated or that they fail to comprehend the subtle-
ties of manipulation cases, and indeed quite the contrary. So given that
the subjects in this study are exhibiting a pattern of responses that mimics
the pattern defended by leading philosophical thinkers who obviously
possess sufficient sophistication, then unless we are given some specific
arguments otherwise, we should not be swayed by sweeping, generic
charges that subjects in this study are too unsophisticated.
It is worth noting that I have undertaken several other studies to test
folk intuitions about ultimate control, i.e., intuitions about whether free
will and moral responsibility require a person to not only be able to
shape her actions in light of her desires, values, and principles of
choice, but also to be able to shape her most basic desires, values, and
principles of choice themselves. Results of these studies show that peo-
ple are quite willing to attribute free will and moral responsibility to an
agent whose fundamental values and evaluative attitudes are clearly
and obviously determined by factors that are completely out of her con-
trol (Sripada, in preparation). Collectively, these studies suggest a
coherent pattern: people’s intuitions appear not to be sensitive to the
origins of an agent’s basic evaluative attitudes (that is, it does not mat-
ter for free will if the agent has control over the initial formation of
these basic evaluative attitudes; they can be instilled by biology, the
environment, luck, or even a manipulator). But given that an agent
already has a certain set of basic evaluative attitudes, people are very
sensitive to the presence of obstacles or impairments that prevent an
agent from selecting actions that reflect her own basic evaluative
stance. I report the results of these studies of ultimate control in a sep-
arate paper, but I mention them briefly here to further dispel the ‘the
folk are too unsophisticated objection’. The fact that the folk are con-
sistent and coherent in this way across studies provides additional evi-
dence that the results of the present study are not simply due to the
folk’s lack of sophistication, but rather these results capture something
genuine about the folk concept of free will.
A second kind of response by incompatibilists to the conclusions of
this study concedes that this study accurately captures what features
our intuitions respond to in manipulation cases (or at least it does not
seek to press an objection on this issue), and instead seeks to deny that
intuitions about manipulation cases matter much for the Argument
from Manipulation. That is, the Argument from Manipulation, it is
claimed, should succeed or fail based on principled argument, rather
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than on whatever intuitions we might have about manipulation cases.
While such a strategy is in principle available, it certainly is unlikely to
be followed by most leading advocates of manipulation arguments such
as Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom. These authors routinely make
appeals to our intuitions in manipulation cases as part of their defenses
of their positions,21 thus evidencing the centrality of these intuitions to
their own strategy for mounting manipulation-based defenses of incom-
patibilism.
It is actually hard to see how a defense of the Argument from
Manipulation that completely eschewed the use of intuitions would
work. Recall that intuitions about manipulation cases are supporting
premise 3 of the argument, i.e., the claim that a manipulated agent is
unfree. How might incompatibilists support this premise without
recourse to intuitions about manipulation cases? The most obvious
answer is that they would rely on any number of more general incom-
patibilist arguments, such as the Consequence Argument (Inwagen,
1983) or the Basic Argument (Strawson, 1994). The problem with this
approach is that these arguments, because they are perfectly general,
apply to manipulated agents and unmanipulated agents equally well.
To the extent these general arguments are used to secure premise 3 of
the Argument from Manipulation, the very generality of these argu-
ments vitiates the topic of manipulation as being of any distinctive
philosophical interest. Manipulation arguments are supposed to pro-
vide evidential weight in favor of incompatibilism that is independent of
other arguments such as the Consequence Argument and Basic Argu-
ment. The most straightforward way for manipulation arguments to
achieve this independence is to divorce them from these other more
general incompatibilist arguments. One way to do this would be to
grant premise 3 non-inferentially, that is, directly from intuitive
judgments regarding manipulation cases. Alternatively, even if we do
not outright grant premise 3 based on our intuitive reactions to manip-
21 For example, Pereboom writes regarding his ‘four cases’ manipulation argument,
‘The best explanation for the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible … is
that his action results from a deterministic causal process…’ (Pereboom, 2001, pg.
116). Kane writes ‘… at this level, the matter is one of ‘‘introspection,’’ or intui-
tion. If a hard-core Hobbesian, or predestinationist, insists that CNC [covert non-
constraining] control does not take away from freedom in any significant sense,
there is little one can say to argue him out of his position… Intuitively, most of us
would concede that human freedom is freedom from every kind of control by oth-
ers, coercive and non-coercive, overt and covert. Most modern compatibilists are
likely to agree as well…’’ (Kane, 1985, pg. 39). In a review of recent work on free
will, Neil Levy and Michael McKenna (both compatibilists) write ‘The Manipula-
tion Argument relies upon our intuitive reactions to what is supposed to be objec-
tionable [about] manipulation of an otherwise normally functioning agent’ (Levy
and McKenna, 2009, pg. 107).
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ulation cases, it is hard to escape giving intuitions in manipulation
cases at least significant evidential weight in whatever argument is even-
tually constructed.22 These considerations lead me to believe that in-
compatibilists who want to mount a manipulation-based defense of
their views have no other option than to accord intuitions about manip-
ulation cases a central place in their arguments. It follows then that the
results of the present study should be seen as quite problematic for in-
compatibilists, as these results suggest that these intuitions are actually
responding to impairments in compatibilist psychological conditions
for free will.
Before concluding, it is worth re-emphasizing several methodological
points. This study illustrates how experimental methods, especially sta-
tistical techniques such as correlation analysis, mediation analysis, and
structural equation modeling, can help philosophers solve the critical
features problem—the problem of figuring out which among the myr-
iad features present in hypothetical cases are the critical one(s) our
intuitions are responding to. As I noted earlier, the debate between
compatibilists and incompatibilists about manipulation cases is not
about the content of intuitions in response to these cases. Both camps,
for the most past, agree that there is a compelling intuition that manip-
ulated agents are not free. The debate has rather been about what fea-
tures of manipulation cases drive our intuitive responses. Given well-
entrenched views on either side that our intuitions are responding to
quite different things in these cases, prospects appear dim that armchair
methods alone can break this impasse. Indeed, given extensive psycho-
logical evidence that people are generally quite unreliable about
figuring out the factors that are driving their intuitive judgments23 (see
Sripada and Konrath (2011) for a full discussion of this point), one
should have a healthy dose of skepticism towards claims that arise
22 See for example the exchange between Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna
regarding the Argument from Manipulation in which intuitions about manipulation
cases play a key role for both thinkers (Mckenna, 2008, Pereboom, 2008, especially
section 2). Both philosophers appear to agree that intuitions by themselves do not
decisively answer whether a manipulated is free. Rather intuitions serve a number
of less dispositive though nonetheless quite important purposes, such as justifying
which attitudes it is initially rational to hold and altering burdens of proof.
23 It is interesting to consider whether the subjects in this study whose intuitions were
shown to be responding to judgments of corrupted information and deep self dis-
cordance were aware that these factors were what their intuitions were in fact
tracking. A reasonable hunch is that they lacked this awareness. Rather, I suspect
that if asked how they came to believe that Bill in the manipulation version of the
vignette lacks free will, they might have cited superficially salient features of the
case (such as that Bill’s desires were caused to arise by another agent), even though
there is good reason to believe that this feature is not what their intuitions in fact
responded to.
WHAT MAKES A MANIPULATED AGENT UNFREE? 587
exclusively from the armchair that purport to decisively answer the
question of what features of hypothetical cases our intuitions are
responding to. Thus, where philosophical debates hinge critically on
questions about what features of cases our intuitions track, philoso-
phers should avail themselves of additional empirical-cum-statistical
methods that can complement existing a priori methods of philosophi-
cal inquiry.
Conclusion
Incompatibilists and most compatibilists agree that a manipulated
agent, as described in a standard manipulation case, is unfree, though
they differ about what features of these cases our intuitions are
responding to. In this paper, I investigated this issue experimentally.
Results showed that subjects’ tendency to judge that a manipulated
agent is unfree was fully explained by their judgments that the manipu-
lated agent suffers from damage to certain key psychological capacities.
These results strongly support the view that intuitions in manipulation
cases are responsive to impairments in just the kinds of psychological
capacities that compatibilists have long claimed are the basis for free
will. They also put serious pressure on incompatibilists’ use of manipu-
lation cases to support their position.
Appendix
All subjects were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a vali-
dated method of subject recruitment and data collection (Buhrmester et
al., 2011). Subjects were directed to a secure website where they com-
pleted an online survey, and were then paid for their time. The ques-
tions used in this study were presented in a randomized order.
Additional questions probed Dr. Z’s responsibility, as well as Bill and
Dr. Z’s degree of blame and punishment, and were not part of the
present analysis. All dependent variables were inspected for deviations
from normality assumptions. For all variables, skewness and kurtosis
were less than 1.5.
Simple mediation analysis was conducted according to the recom-
mentations of Baron and Kenny (1986). The effect size of mediation
paths are reported as percentages in the main text as well as in
Table A2 and Table A4. These percentages represent mediation effect
ratios, defined as: (the indirect effect of the predictor on the
outcome) ⁄ (the total effect of the predictor on the outcome) (Shrout and
Bolger, 2002).
Structural equation analyses were performed with EQS (Multivari-
ate Software Inc, Encino CA), a commercially available software
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package for implementing structural equation modeling. The covari-
ance matrix analyzed is shown in Table A3. Due to multivariate non-
normality (Mardia’s normalized coefficient = 13.4), Satorra-Bentler
adjustment was performed, and robust fit statistics are reported for
all analyses. To verify indicators loaded on the hypothesized factors,
a measurement model was tested (Figure A1). This model displayed
good fit with the data (S-BC2(24, N = 240) = 33.3, p = 0.1;
NFI = 0.974; CFI = 0.993; RMSEA = 0.04, PCLOSE n.s.). Modifi-
cation indices were thresholded at p < 0.01 to avoid capitalizing on
chance relationships in the data (MacCallum et al., 1992), in accor-
dance with practices recommended in the literature (Bentler, 1995).
These indices did not recommend changing any relationships between
indicators and latent factors. Alternative two factor measurement
models (e.g., in which corrupted information and deep self discor-
dance indicators are combined to indicate a single ‘psychological
impairment’ factor) and a one factor model were tested and all mod-
els yielded substantially worse fit with the data than the three factor
model shown in Figure A1. The structural equation model in Figure 2
in the main manuscript was selected based on antecedent theoreti-
cal hypotheses. This model displayed good fit with the data
(S-BC2(30, N = 240) = 56.8, p = 0.002; NFI = 0.965; CFI = 0.983;
RMSEA = 0.06, PCLOSE n.s.), and modification indices did not
recommend addition or removal of paths.
Table A1:
















1 1.60 (1.2) 4.09 (1.8) 3.03 (1.7)
2 1.82 (1.6) 3.51 (1.8) 2.78 (1.7)
3 1.49 (1.2) 3.16 (1.8) 2.38 (1.5)
4 5.60 (1.6) 2.80 (1.8) 4.33 (2.1)
5 5.28 (1.7) 3.38 (1.8) 5.12 (1.8)
6 5.43 (1.6) 3.08 (1.7) 4.42 (1.9)
7 6.07 (1.3) 4.43 (1.7) 4.63 (1.7)
8 6.48 (1.1) 3.72 (1.8) 4.28 (1.9)
9 6.32 (1.1) 3.77 (1.6) 4.07 (1.8)
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Table A2:







(all p values < 0.001)
% of variance








4 )0.577 30.0% <0.001
5 )0.527 22.2% <0.001
6 )0.436 10.1% 0.08
7 )0.476 17.2% <0.001
8 )0.650 44.7% <0.001
9 )0.593 33.1% <0.001
Table A3:
Covariance Matrix for Structural Equation Modeling
Analysis for Study#1.
Vignette 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Vignette 0.251
1 0.626 3.93
2 0.425 2.546 3.63
3 0.418 1.946 1.654 3.015
4 )0.703 )2.526 )2.208 )1.906 4.872
5 )0.475 )2.066 )1.671 )1.522 2.859 3.912
6 )0.59 )1.769 )1.535 )1.513 3.054 2.616 4.188
7 )0.412 )1.615 )1.226 )1.44 1.909 1.584 1.616 2.923
8 )0.692 )2.609 )2.022 )1.789 2.797 2.29 2.185 2.211 4.095
9 )0.64 )2.215 )1.701 )1.746 2.69 1.936 2.199 2.09 2.85 3.546
Figure A1: Measurement Model for Study#1. This model provides
evidence that the ratings elicited from subjects (shown as boxes) serve
to indicate three underlying factors (shown as ovals).
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Table A4:
Results from Simple Mediation Analysis for Study#2. * = p < 0.5;





ratings (all p values < 0.001,
except where noted)
% of variance






4 )0.329 15.8% <0.01
5 )0.157* 1.4% n.s.
6 )0.237 8.2% 0.05
7 )0.584 48.07% <0.001
8 )0.606 70.3% <0.001
9 )0.585 71.3% <0.001
7,8,9 90.3% <0.001
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